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Universities and Government Business Enterprises (GBEs) are economically significant 
and form part of the Australian public sector. Over the last thirty years both Universities 
and GBEs have gone through significant regulatory changes with respect to enhancing 
their efficiency and effectiveness. These changes have led to, amongst other things, 
explicit and implicit performance requirements for these entities coupled with the 
deregulation of University Vice Chancellor (VC) and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
GBEs compensation. This thesis investigates the question of:  
“Is there an association between the levels and changes in VCs’ and CEOs’ 
compensation and the performance of Australian universities and GBEs?”  
The key findings are: (i) there is no association between external University rankings and 
levels of and changes in VC compensation, (ii) there is no association between financial 
performance measures of GBEs and levels of and changes in CEO compensation even 
after controlling for their community service obligations. The only explanatory variable 
that is associated with both VCs’ and CEOs’ compensation is size. Both sets of results 
are robust with respect to alternative econometric specifications, alternative variable 
specifications and other sensitivity tests.
